The Potential for Ethics Without God Through Bertrand Russell\u27s Authentic Notion of Philosophical Inquiry by Magrini, James
College of DuPage
DigitalCommons@C.O.D.
Philosophy Scholarship Philosophy
7-1-2009
The Potential for Ethics Without God Through
Bertrand Russell's Authentic Notion of
Philosophical Inquiry
James Magrini
College of DuPage, magrini@cod.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.cod.edu/philosophypub
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at DigitalCommons@C.O.D.. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@C.O.D.. For more information, please contact koteles@cod.edu.
Recommended Citation
Magrini, James, "The Potential for Ethics Without God Through Bertrand Russell's Authentic Notion of Philosophical Inquiry"
(2009). Philosophy Scholarship. Paper 4.
http://dc.cod.edu/philosophypub/4
The Potential for Ethics Without God Through Bertrand Russell’s Authentic 
Notion of Philosophical Inquiry 
 
J. M. Magrini  
College of Dupage 
 
  
Violence dominates the landscape of our present world. Prejudice and sectarianism threaten 
human rights, putting our hopes for the authentic possibility of humane ethical/moral interaction 
on a global scale in serious question. Ours is a world where epistemological and ethical 
relativism appear to rule the day. In these extremely hard times, it would benefit us, as 
philosophers, informed thinkers, and concerned human beings, to revisit with a discerning eye 
and charitable heart the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, which reminds us in a powerfully 
persuasive manner just how important philosophy can be in offering hope for a better world 
during dark, turbulent times. In what follows, I examine the unique way in which Russell 
responds to the following question: What is philosophy good for, what is the value of philosophy 
for the world and its inhabitants? His response to these queries resonates with a distinctive 
ethical tone and timbre.       
 It was Russell (1985) who began seriously thinking about the legitimate possibility of 
humanist ethics without God when writing Why I am Not a Christian, wherein he claimed that 
religion was a pariah on the human condition, the cause of unthinkable and immeasurable 
suffering. “I regard [religion] as a disease,” he wrote, “born out of fear and as a source of untold 
misery to the human race” (p. 125). Russell also believed that religion was inconsequential to our 
understanding and practice of morality. Despite living in a world devoid of intrinsic value, a 
world in which no divinely sanctioned, objective and absolute moral principles existed, it was 
our duty to search out “human” values and meanings, and it was possible, according to Russell, 
because of our capability to think rationally and our capacity to be deeply moved on an 
emotional level, to understand the world in distinctly moral terms: 
  
 Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolution of her secular hurryings through the 
abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, still subject to her power, but gifted 
with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of 
his unthinking Mother (p. 152).       
  
 In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell wrote in a highly speculative and refreshingly 
poetic manner about that which is crucial to the understanding of what good philosophy is all 
about, namely, the indispensable concern for the ethical when approaching the ultimate questions 
of existence.  According to Russell, if practiced as an ethical discipline, philosophy can guide our 
enquiry along the path to knowledge of the world, and more importantly, philosophy can also 
inspire us to actively improve the world that we inhabit with others. Russell identifies 
philosophy’s value in its potential to authentically inspire our practical ethical comportment, 
fostering and enhancing our legitimate interpersonal relationships, as a secondary benefit of a 
unique method of enquiry. Russell believes that philosophical enquiry is best practiced as an 
ethical endeavor when it retains and accentuates the crucial distinction between what Russell 
terms the “Self” (the philosopher) and the “not-Self” (the objects of the philosopher’s 
contemplation), stressing a charitable and respectful attitude toward questioning the world at 
large and its inhabitants.  
 Russell (1969) opposes the traditional and dogmatic subject-centered model of 
philosophical enquiry that, “fetters contemplation to the self” and finds its ground in the 
absolutist tendency to reduce the objects of its enquiry to a comprehensive and categorical body 
of systematic knowledge in which the notion of difference, or otherness, is either pared down or 
abolished (p 159).  According to Russell, what traditional philosophy calls knowledge, “is not a 
union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and designs making an impenetrable veil 
between us and the world beyond” (p 159). Russell’s distrust of rigid, systematic philosophical 
explanation emerges from his critique of all forms of philosophy that display the heedless drive 
to understand the world in unabashedly categorical terms. He is also critical of philosophies 
which attempt to force the vast and expansive universe to conform with our preconceived 
epistemological notions of how things should be, presumptuously embracing the idea of Man as 
the “measure of all things” while callously neglecting the all-important ethical distinction 
between the Self and the not-Self (p 159).   
 In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell effectively attacks the epistemological relativism 
of Protagoras, Nietzsche’s idea of truth as a human construct, the idealism of Bishop Berkeley, 
and Kant’s monumental attempt in The Critique of Pure Reason  to reconcile rationalism with 
the tenets of empiricism. Russell’s brilliant critique of the Western philosophical tradition 
renders the aforementioned positions unsound and illogical. For in essence, as related to 
Russell’s understanding of ethical philosophical enquiry, they fail to adopt a charitable and 
respectful attitude toward the not-Self. “There is a widespread [negative] philosophical 
tendency,” writes Russell, 
 
towards the view that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is manmade, that space 
and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and if there be anything 
not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us (p 159). 
  
 Philosophers fall into error, according to Russell, for two reasons. First, they make the 
assumption that humans are seamlessly woven into the complex fabric of the world, and 
secondly, they believe that it is possible to “assimilate the universe to Man,” and not vice versa 
(p 159).  Importantly, when we incorrectly perceive and judge that the world is just like us, that 
is, that the world is identical to the “Self,” we mistakenly imagine that “knowledge of it is 
possible without admission of what seems alien” (p 158). Russell, quite correctly, is highly 
critical of the pervasive attitude within much of philosophy’s tradition that believes that all 
knowledge of the world presupposes a reduction and assimilation of the object to the thinking 
subject into a closed, all-encompassing, system of explanation, or grand-narrative. 
  Russell eloquently describes the philosopher’s (Self) authentic relationship with the 
objects of philosophical contemplation (not-Self) in terms of a union that must be liberated from 
any and all self-centered aims on the part of the thinker. “Knowledge,” as Russell states, “is a 
from of union of Self and not-Self; and like all union, it is impaired by dominion and therefore 
by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves” (p 159). 
According to Russell, the philosopher must, with steadfast resolve, abstain from the headstrong 
disposition that would violently force the objects of philosophical  contemplation to conform 
with preconceived notions of how they should be, for philosophical knowledge can never be 
subjugated or controlled by the thinking subject. Knowledge of a philosophical nature is never a 
possession of the thinker because it always transcends the possibility of reducing the world to 
our ways of perceiving and thinking.  
 Russell states that philosophical contemplation, in the form of the union of Self and not-
Self, should never “aim at proving that the rest of the universe is akin to man” (p 158). Rather, in 
Russell’s opinion, it is philosophy that must adapt to “the characters which it finds in its objects,” 
and if the philosopher grants to the objects of his contemplation the just due of their uniqueness 
and “otherness,” he expresses an attitude that embraces and actively works to preserve the 
sublime sense of wonder inherent to our world and the infinite universe (p 16). Russell demands 
that all philosophical investigation should adopt an ethical approach to its questioning, which is 
highlighted and characterized by the desire to allow the not-Self, that which is radically Other 
and always beyond our absolute comprehension, to retain its question-worthy status, its unique, 
foreign, and mysterious nature with respect to our ways of being.  
 In response to the possibility of allowing the objects of our philosophical thoughts to 
retain their uniqueness, or transcendent natures, as we attempt to understand them, Russell 
proposes an ethical model for philosophical enquiry wherein “true” contemplation, “finds its 
satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects 
contemplated” (p 160). As opposed to interpreting the universe as a means to the philosopher’s 
ends, in a relationship that privileges the Self above the universe (not-Self), Russell reverses the 
variables in the equation by proposing an authentic model for philosophical enquiry, as 
contemplation, wherein the universe, or not-Self, is given priority. Russell urges the philosopher 
to grant a sense of superiority to the objects of philosophy, and “through the infinity of the 
universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity” (p 159). Russell 
understands knowledge as the product of the asymmetrical union between the Self and not-Self, 
wherein the philosopher embraces the recalcitrant universe, and through a loving, intractable, 
and ever-evolving discourse, works to reveal the hidden nature of the universe. The universe, in 
turn, remains forever beyond the philosopher’s logical grasp, despite the philosopher’s best 
attempts at explanation.  
 For unlike the sciences, the problems, issues, and questions to which we can provide no 
definitive solutions and responses, “remain to form the residue which is called philosophy” (p 
155). If it should ever be the case that philosophy provides a categorical explanation for the 
things it interrogates, they leave the purview of philosophy and become something other than a 
subject for philosophy. The philosopher must recognize that definitive knowledge of the world, 
specifically in terms of philosophical knowledge, is a hopelessly impossible ideal. 
 True contemplation, according to Russell, finds satisfaction and its value in all that 
enlarges and ameliorates the not-Self, or the objects of philosophical reflection. Philosophical 
contemplation conceived as an ethical endeavor is the liberating freedom from narrow 
subjective, egoistic aims and expresses an impartial attitude through “the unalloyed desire for 
truth,” which should always be free from prejudice and dogmatism in all matters of truth-seeking 
(p 160). It is Russell’s claim that the freedom and impartiality of  the philosopher’s charitable 
and respectful attitude afforded to the objects of thought carries over into the philosopher’s 
interpersonal relationships, preserving a similar freedom and impartiality in the realm of 
practical activity, which includes the understanding of the human as a fragile, passionate, and 
emotional being. Russell is careful to elucidate and punctuate the notions of authentic social 
justice and universal love that emerge from philosophy’s unique method of ethical reflection. 
According to Russell, retaining the openness of both mind and soul in the unprejudiced quest for 
philosophical truth is, “the very same quality of mind which, in action is justice, and in emotion 
as the universal love which can be given to all, and not only those who are judged useful or 
admirable” (p 161).  Just as the great philosopher resists the complete “objectification” of his 
subject-matter, so too the good, moral human avoids the “objectification” of other human beings. 
With such understanding, perhaps we can acquire a newfound respect for the differences within 
others, allowing those people with whom we share the world to retain their uniqueness. Thus, as 
opposed to privileging our own personal desires, treating others as disposable means-to-the-ends 
of our projects, the possibility exists for a renewed sense of dignity to rise up from the heart of 
the human condition.  
 This protracted relationship between Self and not-Self, one that graduates from 
theoretical enquiry to the realm of practical interpersonal social interaction, can be grasped at the 
level of inter-subjective discourse, for Russell is adamant that the objects of philosophical 
reflection can never be reduced to philosophical subjectivism (solipsism) or expressed in terms 
of objective, universal truth. Russell seeks to demonstrate that ethical discourse on the social 
level plays out in the manner of charitable philosophical interrogation, which attempts to address 
the various quandaries it encounters with a heightened sense of respect, and such a context for 
ethical interaction would perhaps manifest through a loving, intractable, and ever-evolving social 
discourse in which radical differences are not only recognized, but further, are privileged and 
preserved above similarity and identity. Importantly, Russell intimates the responsibility that I 
have for each and every living being who is quite literally not like me, radically Other in their 
existence. In this realm of authentic social discourse, the philosopher (Self) also assumes the role 
of the Other (not-Self) within a context where others retain their privileged status as unique, 
different, and indefinable human beings, and it is in this radical notion of the not-Self 
(Otherness) that Russell locates the center of human dignity. In the immediacy of our ethical 
encounters with the other, we are struck and overwhelmed by our innate responsibility to be as 
ethical, engulfed by the transcendent sense of wonder that allows for the manifestation of  
“familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.”                 
 According to Russell, philosophy should not to be studied because it procures definitive 
answers to its questions. Rather, he suggests that philosophy should be pursued and practiced for 
the way it enriches our intellect, soul, and contributes to the understanding of human potential, 
which always includes the pressing and immediate concern with authentic ethical relationships. 
However, it must be stressed that Russell is not propounding a rigid and complete ethical schema 
or system for moral behavior, with prescribed and proscribed rights and duties. Rather, he is 
working to break open the space, or context, within which the potential exists for revealing and 
nurturing authentic ethical encounters in the first instance, the rich soil from which ethics can 
take root, growing and flourishing in time with the proper attention. This represents Russell’s 
original and primordial thinking on ethics, perhaps in terms of offering the grounds for a possible 
ethics to emerge from the context established by the ethical model of philosophical enquiry, 
which is highlighted by the relationship, or union, between the Self and not-Self, between the 
philosopher and the objects of philosophical contemplation. 
 Nielsen (1990) has argued persuasively for an ethics without God, addressing the 
problems of skepticism, relativism, and nihilism as they emerge from Sartre’s existentialism, by 
looking to the aspects of our lives that are not merely instrumental to the achievement of further 
goods, but those things which are good intrinsically, “relatively permanent sources of 
happiness,” such as friendship, love, meaningful employment, security, the pursuit of ethical and 
aesthetic endeavors (p. 118). Admitting that morality can never be an exact science, Nielsen 
states that it is possible to establish the grounds for a humanist ethics within universal and agreed 
upon sources of value, beginning with the basic “assumption that happiness and self-awareness 
are fundamentally good and that pain and suffering are never desirable in themselves” (p. 119). 
Without divine explanations and assurances that our world is indeed meaningful and value-laden, 
Nielsen identifies many ways in which our lives take on meaning by examining the many 
overlapping and interrelated explanations and purposes that are distinctly human in origin, 
universally human. We do not require religion in order to understand the world as a meaningful 
place of dwelling: “The goals we set for ourselves,” as Nielsen points out, “are enough to give 
meaning to our lives” (p. 119).  
 Russell would not disagree with the ethical philosophy of Nielsen as outlined. However, 
there is an important aspect of Russell’s philosophy to which I have alluded that requires an 
explication, for it is often overlooked within the realm of moral speculation on the whole, 
namely, the legitimate concern for “difference,” the various aspects of our unique situations that 
make us radically unique, and even strange and frightening, that lies at the heart of our moral 
endeavors. Nielsen’s secular ethics depend on inter-subjective agreement, on the universalization 
of human commonalities stemming from rational, emotional, psychological, and physiological 
sources, based on the assumption that common, if not identical, wants, needs, and desires are 
shared by all humans, whether secular or God-fearing Christians. And while this is an obvious, 
and to a great extent, logical starting point for humanist ethics, both Russell and Levinas, each in 
his own novel way, show there is concern for a problem inherent in such thinking that attempts 
to ground ethics exclusively the notion of universal similarity. It is argued, that within such a 
view to ethics there is the imminent danger that the important distinction between “the same” 
(The Self) and “the other” (the Not-Self) will be lost or obliterated; privilege and exclusion 
emerge as inevitable side-effects when the totalization of “the same” occurs at the exclusion of 
“the other.”                     
 This is precisely the problem with traditional morality that Levinas (Totality and Infinity) 
addresses when arguing for the necessity of an understanding of a more authentic and primordial 
notion of ethics as existing prior to metaphysical or ontological knowledge. According to 
Levinas, traditional ethics as I have described, establishing moral principles based on our 
Common Human Nature, resembles idealist metaphysical speculation in that it adopts the 
methodology of traditional ontology, or the study of Being qua Being, striving for systematic 
knowledge of the human and its world, albeit in “ethical” terms, in which all differences are 
resolved within or excluded from the totality of the system. For Levinas, and this can also be said 
of Russell, it is the Other, as the locus of radical difference, who can never be assimilated by me 
in knowledge, that first demands my legitimate ethical response, establishing the origins and 
gesturing toward the potential parameters of ethics. As Levinas writes, “The strangeness of the 
Other, his irreducibility to the ‘I,’ to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished 
as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics” (p. 43).  
 It is possible to view Russell as resembling a kindred philosophical spirit to Levinas, 
because Russell also discusses an ethical relationship that is importantly characterized by the 
human’s (the Self) encounter with the radically Other nature of the not-Self. In a similar fashion, 
Russell appears to oppose the notions of identity or similarity forming the singular fundamental 
ground, or bedrock, for establishing morality based on what  we all share universally, he suggests 
that the potential for ethics must also be considered from the notion of difference, or the radical 
and transcendent nature of the Other’s being. There is a unique particularity bound up with the 
problem of ethics that Russell refuses to ignore, and the contemporary global landscape is such 
that the obvious and apparent differences between cultures cannot be ignored. Technology, in 
one respect, has brought the world’s population into closer proximity than in any other historical 
age. Ironically, and herein lies the tragic double-bind at the root of humanity’s struggles, despite 
the nearness of the proximity, there exists a profound ethical distance between human beings, 
which appears to be insurmountable, and so I return to the question that began the essay: What is 
the value of philosophy for the world and its inhabitants? 
 Russell (1969) has provided a powerfully viable response to this query, and in these hard 
times, I believe that we would benefit by taking seriously what Russell has to say about the 
practice of philosophical enquiry. Ultimately, the only hope for authentic social justice is through 
united group activity - and if Russell is correct, philosophy holds the potential to inspire such 
practical ethical activity, with the potential to make us true cosmopolitans in this rapidly 
expanding epoch of globalization, “citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war 
with all the rest” (p. 161). 
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